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ABSTRACT 
This paper is about a preference within contemporary left-wing culture for defining opponents as 
not belonging rather than seeking to win them over. Opponents are constructed as being outside 
of the community of the good or the progressive. This licenses their treatment as ‘other’, 
impermeable to political argument, reason and evidence. 
The Corbyn faction in the Labour Party employs an ethic of disdain for ad hominem politics but is 
keenly concerned with the construction and policing of the boundaries of progressive discourse. 
This faction’s rise to leadership is symbolic of the prominence of this political culture. 
As a sort of anti-imperialist ‘campism’ emerges as the pre-eminent principle of the progressive 
movement, hostility to Israel becomes a key marker of political belonging. This paper examines 
the Livingstone Formulation, a rhetorical device that seeks to construe the raising of the issue of 
antisemitism as more suspect and inherently problematic than the phenomenon of antisemitism 
itself. The construction of opponents of the Israel boycott campaign as external to the community 
of the University and College Union (UCU) provides case-study material. 
The conclusion draws on the social critique of the Enlightenment notion of the autonomous rational 
subject. This critique downplays reason and human agency in social life. It is a development from 
the notion of false consciousness which facilitates a spiral into what Hannah Arendt (1975) 
analysed as a central feature of totalitarian politics: a culture in which disagreements are treated 
as ‘originating in deep natural, social, or psychological sources beyond the control of the individual 
and therefore beyond the power of reason’. 
  
PART 1: CORBYN AND THE COMMUNITY OF THE GOOD  
From the beginning of his campaign for the leadership of the UK Labour Party, one of Jeremy 
Corbyn’s most distinctive rhetorical stances has been: ‘I don’t do personal’ (Hattenstone 2015).  
During the campaign he responded in a speech to criticism from Tony Blair: 
What this campaign is not about, and never will be about, is personal abuse, name calling, 
calling into question the character of other people, or other candidates. I believe many 
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people, particularly young people, are totally turned off by the politics of celebrity, 
personality, personal abuse, name calling and all that kind of thing. Let’s be adult about it. 
Let’s have a serious debate, serious discussion, serious proposals put forward… (Hartley 
2015). 
In this article I argue that this statement by Jeremy corbyn is not only misleading, it is a profound 
inversion of the actual culture of his political milieu. 
The Corbyn faction’s political practice is actually to avoid debate over ideas and policies. Instead it 
defines itself as the community of the good and it positions its opponents and its critics as being 
outside of that community. It is not doing this consciously and the suggestion that this is what is 
happening would be angrily rejected. But this ‘politics of position’, as I am calling it, is a significant 
phenomenon which is deeply embedded in contemporary left-wing political culture. Hannah Arendt 
(1975) argued that one of the defining features of totalitarian politics was the portrayal of political 
disagreements ‘as invariably originating in deep natural, social, or psychological sources beyond 
the control of the individual and therefore beyond the power of reason.’ The Corbyn left’s 
political praxisis not yet totalitarian but neither is it close to being confined to the democratic 
terrain of debate, argument and evidence. 
The only Labour leader to have won General Elections in the era of colour television is Tony Blair. 
He won three. He is hated with a passion and a venom that goes beyond political disagreement. 
The apocryphal insult thrown back at a Labour critic of Corbyn on a Facebook thread is: ‘you’re a 
Tory’. It could just as easily be ‘you’re a Zionist’ or ‘you’re a Blairite’. Exiling a critic outside the 
community of the good and punishing them for their bad faith is preferred to offering reasons why 
they may be mistaken on a matter of principle, policy or fact. 
Admittedly it is true that there is a tribalism present in all political organisation; a warm 
camaraderie for ‘us’ and some degree of disrespect for ‘them’. Political narrative ties ideas and 
policies to communities of belonging emotionally as well as intellectually. But in the Corbyn 
phenomenon this process of staking out the boundaries separating the in-crowd from the out-
crowd is key. 
Perhaps this is because we are looking at a form of identity politics as much as a programme for 
government or radical change. If Labour cannot win even with Ed Miliband, and it has no interest 
in winning with a Tony Blair, then perhaps it is ready to lose courageously and honestly with a 
Jeremy Corbyn. 
In a poll carried out during the leadership campaign, Andy Burnham and Yvette Cooper both 
scored higher than Corbyn with Labour members on the question: ‘are they likely to win a General 
Election?’ but Corbyn scored much higher on the question ‘Should they be leader?’ (Dahlgreen 
2015). In another poll ‘knows how to win elections’ was thought to be ‘among the most important 
leadership qualities’ by only 27 per cent of voters in the leadership election (Kirkup 2015). 
There is still the rich and exciting fantasy that Corbyn can sweep to power with his radicalism and 
his ‘new politics’; that he can enthuse masses of new people, persuade them, make them believe; 
that he can repeat in the country the impossible victory that he achieved in the Party. 
But perhaps more important is the inward looking ‘not in my name’ politics which has given up on 
winning and on the positive hope of changing the world. The politics of socialism, a positive 
constructive project, has been replaced by the politics of resistance and of critique, a negative 
symbolic enterprise concerned primarily with asserting innocence. It is also infantilising insofar as 
it contents itself with opposition, often moralistic, often ineffectual. 
The intense personal payoff of this variant of identity politics is a feeling of inner cleanliness. The 
world may be utterly compromised and there may be nothing I can do about it, but it isn’t going to 
be my fault, my own soul is clean. In this sense, while the Corbyn faction loves to say that it 
doesn’t do personal, it doesn’t do political either. 
In the same speech quoted above, eight seconds after Corbyn has said he hates name calling and 
personal abuse, he indulges in name calling and abuse. ‘The rich’ and ‘the powerful’, he says, ‘that 
benefit so much from our political system, don’t care what kind of name calling goes on, providing 
their tax breaks go on….’ The rich and the powerful don’t care about any kind of personal bullying 
because they only care about themselves. It is fine to ‘do personal’ when the target is outside of 
the community of the progressive and the good. 
Corbyn goes on to say he feels that those who ‘resort to personal abuse and name calling’ are 
really ‘probably a bit nervous about the power of democracy.’ He finds another way to address the 
putative root cause rather than the point made. 
When Corbyn is challenged on his beliefs and his record, he tends to respond by characterising a 
political challenge as a personal attack. He treats it as intrusive, rude and vulgar. In so doing, he 
accomplishes three things. He paints himself as the innocent victim of unjust aggression; he 
avoids responding to the detail of the challenge; and he bolsters the distinction between the good 
people inside his tent and the bad people outside of it. Howard Jacobson writes: 
There was something ‘How very dare you’, about Jeremy Corbyn’s recent temper tantrum 
in rebuttal of the charge that the company he kept reflected badly on him. ‘The idea that 
I’m some kind of racist or anti-Semitic person is beyond appalling, disgusting and deeply 
offensive,’ he said (Jacobson 2015). 
‘Alarm bells ring when a politician stands haughty upon his honour,’ observes Jacobson. When 
Jeremy says he doesn’t do personal what he means is that he will not deal with criticism in the 
normal way. He will not respond to it by means of reason or argument; he refuses to enter into 
serious engagement over worldviews, over ideas or over his record. He is less interested in trying 
to persuade than in making criticism appear as personal insult. ‘Jeremy doesn’t do personal’ does 
not mean that he refrains from insulting others; it means that he refrains from responding to that 
which he is able to construct as insulting. 
It is not accidental that the issue of antisemitism has become pivotal to this process of defining 
who is inside and who is not. In the post-war period, in democratic discourse at least, everybody 
recognised antisemitism as being bad and they recognised opposition to antisemitism as an entry 
requirement into progressive politics. Now, just the action of initiating a discussion about what is 
antisemitic and what is not rings alarm bells for people schooled in progressive culture. To ask if 
something said or done is antisemitic, if it relates to Israel or Palestinians, is to risk placing one’s 
own membership of the community of the good under scrutiny. 
It is difficult to engage in a reasoned and evidenced discussion about contemporary antisemitism 
but it is easy to mobilise the issue of antisemitism as an indicator of political cleanliness. In our 
time a person who raises the issue of antisemitism is more clearly recognisable as belonging to the 
wrong crowd than a person who stumbles into actual antisemitism. Raising the issue becomes a 
marker of Blairite, Tory or Zionist obfuscation. It marks a bad faith move designed to silence or to 
de-legitimise criticism of Israel, or even left politics in general. Antisemitism itself, on the other 
hand, when it can plausibly appear supportive of the Palestinians, does little to damage a person’s 
reputation. 
In his speech to the Conservative Party Conference in October 2015, David Cameron criticised 
Jeremy Corbyn for having called the killing of Osama Bin Laden a tragedy. Cameron went on, in 
party conference rhetoric mode, ‘My friends, we cannot let that man inflict his security-
threatening, terrorist-sympathising, Britain-hating ideology on the country we love…’ (Wilkinson 
2015). 
Now Corbyn is for unilateral nuclear disarmament and he has said that if he was prime minister he 
would never use nuclear weapons (Sparrow 2015). Over the years he has made clear his support 
for the ‘Iraqi resistance’, the IRA, Hamas and Hezbollah. Corbyn was the Chair of ‘Stop the War’ 
which has been explicit in its support for those fighting against British and American forces. 
During an appearance on Press TV, the Iranian state English-language propaganda channel, on 
which Corbyn sometimes hosted a show, he had said that the killing of Bin Laden was a tragedy. 
The programme in question (video 1) was hosted by Yvonne Ridley, a leading member of George 
Galloway’sRespect Party. Ridley thinks that ‘Israel is a vile little state’ and has reassured us 
that Respect is a ‘Zionist-free party’ while the mainstream parties are ‘riddled with Zionists’ (Das 
2012). 
In this programme Corbyn participates in a spinning swirl of conspiracy theory; perhaps Bin Laden 
was murdered years before; his killing is like the ‘extra-judicial killing’ of Adolf Eichmann by the 
‘Zionist state’; Charles II and Oliver Cromwell had their heads ‘displayed’, there is a ‘medieval 
triumphalism’ around the death of Bin Laden; Bin Laden’s killing is a ‘tragedy’ like 9/11 and like 
the attack on Afghanistan; the fact that photographs of Bin Laden’s body were not published 
demonstrates that President Obama may be lying about the death. 
So how did Corbyn respond to Cameron’s attack on his nuclear unilateralism, of his support for 
terrorism, of his response to the killing of Bin Laden and of his support for those engaging British 
forces? Corbyn has answers. His political tradition understands the key evils on the planet to be 
American, British and Israeli imperialism. He thinks that forces which oppose imperialism, 
including the Iranian state and Yvonne Ridley, Iraqi Islamist militias, Bin Laden, the IRA, Hamas 
and Hezbollah, are fundamentally defensive. He supports them insofar as they are ‘anti-
imperialist’; insofar as they are anti-democratic, he regards them as creations of imperialism. 
But Jeremy Corbyn did not engage with Cameron’s criticism by defending his own record and his 
own beliefs. Instead, his spokesperson responded with this: ‘The fact that David Cameron used his 
speech to make personal attacks on Jeremy Corbyn are a sure sign that he is rattled by the re-
energisation of the Labour Party.’ 
Corbyn’s official Facebook page characterised Cameron’s speech as the ‘most disgraceful name 
calling’ and as ‘personalised, playground attacks’. It went on: 
You’ll notice the similarity between the prime minister’s words and those of the tabloid 
press, who have smeared Jeremy Corbyn throughout the summer and beyond…. The 
motivations are the same: to drown out debate and make our arguments taboo (Dearden 
2015). 
There seems to be a relationship between support for totalitarian ideas and movements on the one 
hand, and the adoption of totalitarian practices on the other. Hannah Arendt (1975) wrote that a 
defining characteristic of the totalitarian movements of the 20th-century was 
… the introduction of entirely new methods into political propaganda, and indifference to 
the arguments of political opponents; these movements not only placed themselves 
outside and against the party system as a whole, they found a membership that had never 
been reached, never been ‘spoiled’ by the party system. Therefore they did not need to 
refute opposing arguments and consistently preferred methods which ended in death 
rather than persuasion, which spelled terror rather than conviction. 
For sure, the Corbyn phenomenon is not currently a physically violent movement in spite of the 
vicarious thrill it enjoys by embracing violent movements in its global coalition. But my argument 
is that there is a discursive violence present in the way in which it pushes opponents out of the 
room. Arendt’s description (1975) of the totalitarian approach to debate and to 
disagreement resonates with the experiences of those from the left and from within the labour 
movement who have dared to oppose the Jeremy Corbyn faction. 
Struggles over the boundaries of political discourse are often important sites of political 
contestation. On the contemporary left, people and ideas are more and more being bundled over 
the boundaries of legitimate discourse by discursive force rather than rational debate and 
persuasion. This is not done for good reason, but in order to avoid having to give reasons. It is not 
the outcome of debate which positions some kinds of politics outside the community of the good; 
rather the act of positioning prejudges debate itself. In the absence of reasons and discussion, the 
process of defining people as not belonging takes more fixed and essentialist forms. That’s why, 
although there are good reasons to worry about antisemitism on the contemporary left, those 
reasons are not heard. They are silenced by the shared assumption that anyone wanting to give 
such reasons is really speaking in bad faith in order to collude with the oppression of the 
Palestinians. The totalitarians of old defined the enemies of the good in fixed categories. They 
were not people who said this or that; they were people who were this or that. It is the retreat 
from the politics of persuasion and discussion and its replacement with something more menacing 
that is the focus of this paper. (For more on struggles over the boundaries of political discourse 
and antisemitism, see Hirsh 2010). 
PART 2: HOW ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND A TOLERANCE FOR ANTISEMITISM 
BECAME DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMUNITY OF THE 
GOOD 
The next section of this paper looks at how one element of the socialist and critical tradition, 
opposition to colonialism and imperialism, was raised to a new ‘–ism’ itself, anti-imperialism. From 
being one element of the tradition, anti-imperialism became an absolute principle, predominating 
over other left wing and democratic principles such as self-liberation, equality, democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights, liberty, women’s rights, lesbian and gay rights and national self-
determination. This process is related to a resurgence of antisemitism on the left. 
Corbyn’s victory in the Labour Party is significant as an indicator of the progress of this anti-
imperial-ism from the fringes to centre stage. Characteristics that were at one time confined to the 
dusty and obscure corners of the obsessive left now make a clear claim to be considered 
characteristics of the mainstream left. Nothing about Corbyn’s record put off his supporters, not 
his history of support for antisemitic movements, for example, not his habit of defending 
antisemitic individuals nor his work for Press TV; not his support for the IRA, not his 
encouragement to those fighting against British forces, nor his support for Hamas and Hezbollah. 
None of this constituted an obstacle to supporting his leadership bid. Corbyn won a clear majority 
in every section of the party, amongst full members, trade union affiliated supporters and the new 
category of registered £3 supporters. There is no reason to believe that people voted for Corbyn in 
spite of these views rather than because of them. 
The presence of antisemitism within radical and left wing thought is not new, but in democratic 
countries it had died down significantly after the Holocaust, even if it always remained strong in 
the Soviet Bloc as well as in Arab Nationalist and Islamist circles. In 2001 the confluence of three 
events heralded the return of antisemitism as a temptation for progressives. At Durban there was 
a huge UN conference at which Zionism was constructed as the most significant racism on the 
planet. The following Tuesday was 11 September, when the USA was attacked by Al Qaeda. In the 
same year the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians collapsed and the Second 
Intifada re-normalised the targeting of Jewish civilians as a means of resisting oppression. 
With the post war resurgence of democratic Europe and the rise of American power, much of the 
left began to downplay those of its core values which did not provide a defining contrast against 
the newly dominant democratic ideology. Democratic values were more and more subordinated to 
the principle of opposition to imperialism. Struggles for equality within nations, and solidarity 
between the powerless across national boundaries, were sometimes sacrificed to struggles by 
‘oppressed’ nations and peoples against imperialist states. For ‘imperialist’ read ‘democratic’. For 
‘oppressed nations’ read ‘the men who rule over them and speak in their name’. 
This set of developments led to a splitting of the antiracist tradition. Any racism that was 
understood to be rooted in imperialism was vigorously opposed while any racism that blurred the 
black/white binary was downplayed. 
The peoples who tended to suffer most acutely as a result of the struggle againstimperialism were 
those who were held to be compromised by their ‘collaboration’ with imperialism: Tutsis, Tamils, 
Kurds, Baha’is, Yazidis, African Asians, Bosniaks, Armenians, Ukranians and of course, Jews. Some 
on the left are not as exercised as they might be by the oppression of these groups because it is 
carried out by forces which they think of as broadly on the progressive side in the struggle against 
imperialism. The blood of those on the anti-imperialist left only really boils when it perceives white 
people, or people that it constructs as white, to be the villains. The left can be so tied to this 
emotional framework that it comes to feel as though all bad things in the world are the work of 
white people. Sometimes other people do bad things but, at root, it is white people who are found 
to be responsible. In this way, a part of the left finds itself stumbling into a worldview in which the 
only significant social agents are white people and all others are constructed as infantilised victims. 
Jews seem to have the attribute, in the imagination of this current on the contemporary left, of 
being both white and not white; they are both ‘us’ and also not quite ‘us’. They are sufficiently ‘us’ 
to give westerners the satisfaction of basking in the required guilt, but they are sufficiently not ‘us’ 
so that westerners can project their guilt onto them. 
The Jews of the Holocaust still symbolise absolute powerlessness, the oppressed; but the Jews 
who survived the Holocaust, particularly those who found sanctuary in Israel or the US, fit better 
into another ready-made way of thinking about Jews: disproportionate power. In the tradition 
of secondary antisemitism, the Holocaust itself is thought to be one significant source of that 
power. In the tradition of anti-capitalist antisemitism, the sale of their souls to imperialism is the 
other source of Jewish power. This is the old ambivalence of the left: are the Jews glamorously 
powerless or are they menacingly all too powerful? Are they oppressed or oppressors? 
The Corbynist worldview is one which sees some authoritarian states, some terrorist movements 
and some kinds of antisemitism as being objectively on our side against imperialism, as being part 
of the global progressive movement. Sometimes there is an admission that the violence and the 
antisemitism of these ‘comrades’ are not quite in keeping with our own values; they are admittedly 
not pretty, but who are ‘we’ to lecture to the oppressed about values? 
Alan Johnson (2015) characterises this worldview which raises anti-imperialism to an absolute and 
which places great emphasis on position rather than agency, ‘campism’. 
It has caused parts of the left to abandon universal progressive values rooted in the 
Enlightenment and sign up instead as foot soldiers in what they see as the great contest 
between – these terms change over time, … – ‘Progressive’ versus ‘Reactionary nations, 
‘Imperialism versus ‘Anti-Imperialism, Oppressed’ versus ‘Oppressor’ peoples, ‘The Empire 
versus ‘The Resistance’, or simply ‘Power versus ‘The Other’. 
It has been steadily gaining ground on three fronts. In academia it has come to dominate 
disciplines such as post-colonial studies and Middle East Studies and it is considered unremarkable 
and scholarly in a number of mainstream disciplines, including English, Sociology and 
Anthropology. Judith Butler, an influential and much admired philosopher and social theorist 
famously said that ‘understanding Hamas, Hezbollah as social movements that are progressive, 
that are on the left, that are part of a global left, is extremely important’ (Johnson 2012). 
She later clarified: ‘They are “left” in the sense that they oppose colonialism and imperialism, but 
their tactics are not ones that I would ever condone.’ (Zimmer et al 2015). 
Butler’s distinction between their positioning within the progressive movement on the one hand 
and what they actually do and say on the other, is significant. It is in particular this practice of 
positioning that is directly relevant to the argument here. Who is considered to be part of the 
progressive movement and who is considered to be outside of the progressive movement? How is 
it decided and what happens to those who are placed outside? 
The second front on which the ‘campist’ worldview was marginal in Britain but has now made huge 
strides into the mainstream is the political left. The way in which positioning is taking precedence 
over debate in the Labour Party is indicative of its growing centrality. 
The third front on which this worldview has been making significant inroads is in public opinion and 
attitudes. My hypothesis is that it is becoming standard within influential liberal and left-wing 
sections of the elite. In this milieu it is perfectly normal to believe, for example, that Tony Bair is a 
war criminal, that Israel should be boycotted, that America is responsible for most of what is 
wrong in the Middle East and that English teenagers who go to fight for Daeshare victims of British 
foreign policy and were radicalised by efforts to stop them. In my world, in my trade union, in my 
university, in my newspaper, in my Labour Party, on BBC Radio 4, the unexamined assumptions of 
this variant of anti-imperialism are to be found frequently repeated without serious critical 
assessment. They constitute the warm background community-defining set of things that good 
people are expected to believe. There are acknowledged and unwritten boundaries which divide 
‘us’, the ‘good people’, from them, the uncultured, the Tories, the Americans, the Neo-Cons, the 
Blairites, the Islamophobes and in particular, the Zionists. 
One of the spheres in which the boundaries of the community of the good are reinforced is 
comedy. Much contemporary comedy in the UK assumes these shared values and it coheres the 
community of the good around shared laughter at those who put themselves outside of it with 
their absurd and laughable opinions. 
I now examine three specific case studies of this division into ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the resulting 
exclusions from the community of the ‘good’: The Livingstone Formulation, the University 
lecturers’ trade union UCU, and the Corbyn campaign. 
Case Study 1. The Livingstone Formulation: how concern about antisemitsm became more 
suspect than antisemitism itself 
One of the key things that progressive people in the UK understand is that making an accusation 
of antisemitism attracts more suspicion than having an accusation of antisemitism made against 
you. 
While Nazi antisemitism and other historical Jew-hatreds are universally understood to have been 
evil, the standard progressive view is that these are phenomena of the past. The thesis outlined in 
academic form by Matti Bunzl (2007), that Islamophobia is the new antisemitism, fits in well with 
current common-sense thinking. The dominant sensibility on the left is that while Nazi 
antisemitism was real and awful, for too long the Jews have made too much of a fuss about it. It is 
all in the past and there are many other less recognised atrocities that deserve attention; there 
are the more recent genocides of which the victims are not white and privileged and do not have 
such easy access to the media and the levers of power. True, the notion of powerful and privileged 
victims of genocide should not survive a moment’s reflection; but it does survive in part owing to 
the left’s ambivalence on where to slot ‘the Jews’ into its schemas and narratives. There are whole 
literatures concerning ways in which Zionism is said to have benefitted from the Holocaust, is said 
to milk the Holocaust for legitimacy, to exaggerate the uniqueness of the Holocaust; and there are 
literatures in which Zionism is even said to have collaborated with or conceived the Holocaust. It is 
also commonly said to re-enact the Holocaust against the Palestinians (Klaff 2014). 
The Livingstone Formulation is named after Ken Livingstone, the former Mayor of London. 
Livingstone got into an argument with a Jewish journalist, Oliver Feingold. Feingold asked him for 
a comment about a birthday party from which he had just emerged. Livingstone got angry and 
Feingold responded that he was ‘only doing his job’. Livingstone latched onto this phrase, replying 
that Feingold was like a Nazi war criminal for using that defence. Feingold told him that he was 
Jewish and he objected to that. Livingstone told the journalist that his paper was ‘was a load of 
scumbags and reactionary bigots’ and that it had a record of supporting Fascism. 
In this ostensibly embarrassing and inconsequential dialogue, Livingstone spotted a political 
opportunity. He wrote an article in The Guardian criticising the occupation of the West Bank in 
which he said: ‘For far too long the accusation of antisemitism has been used against anyone who 
is critical of the policies of the Israeli government, as I have been’ (Livingstone 2006). 
This Livingstone Formulation is a response to a charge of antisemitism. It is a rhetorical device 
which enables the user to refuse to engage with the charge made. It is a mirror which bounces 
back onto an accuser a counter-charge of dishonest Jewish (or ‘Zionist’) conspiracy. 
Firstly, the Livingstone Formulation conflates anything allegedly antisemitic, in this case repeatedly 
insulting a Jewish reporter by comparing him to a Nazi, into the category of legitimate criticism of 
Israel. Secondly, it goes further than accusing people who raise the issue of antisemitism of being 
wrong; it accuses them of being wrong on purpose; of crying wolf, of playing the antisemitism 
card. It alleges an intent, often a collective intent and so a conspiracy, to mobilise Jewish victim-
power for illegitimate purposes. 
Livingstone refused to engage with the actual charge of antisemitism. Instead he preferred to 
accuse his accusers of Zionist bad faith. 
There is a tendency for the Israel-Palestine conflict to attain a place of great symbolic importance. 
If Palestinians are symbolic representatives of the oppressed everywhere, then Israelis tend to 
become symbolic representatives of oppressors everywhere. In this context discussion is 
sometimes less about the actual conflict on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and more a 
struggle over symbolic narrative. The thrusting of Israelis to the centre of a worldview mirrors 
antisemitic traditions insofar as they have always constructed Jews as being central to what is 
wrong with the world (see also Fine 2009). 
Ken Livingstone was neither the first nor the only one to respond to a person, typically a Jew 
raising a concern about antisemitism, with an angry counter-accusation of ‘Zionist’! ‘Protector of 
Israel, oppressor of Palestinians!’ The function of this response is to evade a reasoned discussion 
of the issue and instead to place the person who wants to discuss it outside of the community of 
the progressive. 
The contemporary left wing ‘campist’ political practice of splitting the world into anti-imperialist 
and imperialist states dates back to Stalinist Russian Communism. After a brief flirtation in 1948 
with the idea that Israel might become an ally in the Middle East, Soviet policy shifted to support 
for Arab Nationalist and Ba’athist regimes against Israel. Soviet antisemitism long pre-dated 
Israel, but the Stalinists were the first on the left to see the potential inherent in a strategy of 
demonizing Israel as pro-imperialist. The apartheid smear, that Israel is illegitimate in the same 
way that the apartheid regime in South Africa was illegitimate, was also a Soviet invention (Crooke 
2004). This smear functions as a thought-free shortcut to the politics of boycott. 
In 1952 Rudolph Slanksy, who was himself the murderous dictator of Communist Czechoslovakia, 
was faced with an antisemitic purge by his ‘comrades’. Slansky was removed from power and the 
following ‘confession’ was extracted under torture: 
I deliberately shielded Zionism by publicly speaking out against the people who pointed to 
the hostile activities of Zionists and by describing these people as anti-Semites so that 
these people were in the end prosecuted and persecuted. I thus created an atmosphere in 
which people were afraid to oppose Zionism (Shindler 2011:145-6). 
This is identical to Livingstone’s formulation. The Jew confesses to (or is accused of) mobilising a 
bad-faith accusation of antisemitism in order to silence opposition to Zionism. 
The Livingstone Formulation is employed frequently in contemporary political discourse. The 
Reverend Steven Sizer was a leading supporter in the Church of England of the campaign to 
boycott Israel. He wrote a letter to The Independentresponding to an argument by the Chief Rabbi 
that the campaign was part of an emerging antisemitic culture in the UK. The Synod of the Church, 
wrote Sizer (2006), would not be ‘intimidated by those who … cry “antisemitism” whenever Israeli 
human rights abuses in the occupied territories are mentioned.’ He went on: ‘Why has the 
Archbishop faced a torrent of criticism over [a vote to divest from Caterpillar]? Simple: the people 
in the shadows know that Caterpillar is only the first [boycott].’ 
Sizer responded to an argument that BDS was antisemitic by alleging that the argument was made 
in bad faith ‘by the people in the shadows’, in order to unfairly de-legitimize criticism of Israel and 
the occupation. 
One of the people who leapt to Sizer’s defence against a charge of antisemitism was Jeremy 
Corbyn. Years before he ever imagined becoming Labour leader, Corbyn wrote a letter to the 
Church of England in support of Sizer, saying that he ‘was under attack by a pro-Israeli smear 
campaign.’ (Simons 2015). In other words, Corbyn used the Livingstone Formulation. Sizer was 
later banned by the Church from further participation in social media after he promoted an 
antisemitic article on his Facebook feed entitled: ‘9/11: Israel did it’ (Bingham 2015). 
Alain Badiou is a Maoist philosopher, but this does not prevent him from being considered 
legitimate in antiracist and scholarly circles, or from being celebrated and successful in France and 
around the world. He co-authored a book in 2013 called Reflections on Antisemitism (Badiou et al 
2013) which, in the words of the publisher’s web page, dissects ‘how facile accusations of “anti-
Semitism” are used to stifle dissent’ (Verso 2015). Gérard Bensussan (2014)reviewed the book 
in Libération, arguing that in making antisemitism respectable, the extreme-left had achieved what 
the far-right could only dream of. He argues that Badiou participates in a contemporary restoration 
of French antisemitism. 
Badiou’s first response is that there ‘could be no such thing as a far-left anti-Semitism – an absurd 
oxymoron…’ (Badiou 2014). This is a clear illustration of the eclipse of the politics of reason by the 
politics of position. By definition, there can be no antisemitism in this place, within the community 
of the progressive. The suggestion that there may be such a thing as left antisemitism is not 
rebutted or denied, it is met with a threatening, aggressive and emotional volley of insults which 
effectively puts the person who made the suggestion outside the community. 
Badiou proceeds to respond with the most condescending sarcasm, implying that Bensussan and 
his academic institution are well below his own intellectual level. He says that the accusation of 
antisemitism is a matter for the courts, meaning that it is a libel, but since he places no trust in 
the bourgeois courts, his remedy for the libel is as follows: ‘I’ll simply give Professor Bensussan a 
smack in the face if I ever come across him, which will be a richly deserved reward for his muck-
spreading rhetoric.’ (For more on the pleasures offered by contemporary antisemitism, see Garrard 
2013.) 
Badiou is clear. An accusation of antisemitism, if it concerns a person on the left, if it concerns 
something which relates to hostility to Israel, need only be responded to by violence. Reasons, 
evidence or argument are appropriate for disagreements within the community of the progressive 
but are not appropriate for an accuser of antisemitism. (For more on the Livingstone Formulation 
seeHirsh 2010.) 
Case Study 2: The boycott campaign and the UCU: how Israelis are to be excluded from the 
global community and people defined as their ‘supporters’ from the community of trades unionists 
The campaign to boycott Israel seeks to situate Israel outside of the community of the good and 
the progressive. The campaign situates those Israelis who are unwilling to disavow their country in 
the same way. They are to be isolated, ignored, silenced, excluded and punished; their narratives, 
their experiences and their motivations are to be treated as dishonest propaganda. When people 
within the community of the oppressed do bad things, these things are judged in the material 
context of the bad things that have been done to them. When people are situated outside of the 
community of the oppressed, what they do is judged in a purely formal and abstract way. 
The boycott campaign does not impact at first in Israel. The boycott campaign exists in the UK, in 
America, in South Africa, around the world. The exclusion it seeks to set up is ‘here’, where the 
campaign is, not ‘there’ in the Middle East. The universities from which Israeli scholars are to be 
excluded, the shops which are to be emptied of Israeli goods, the theatres in which Israeli actors 
are not to perform, the sports stadia in which Israeli footballers may not play, they are ‘here’ not 
‘there’. Sometimes people say Corbyn is bad on foreign policy but his domestic agenda against 
austerity is what is important. But the antisemitism of the boycott campaign is not foreign policy, 
it couldn’t be closer to home. It impacts first within the Labour movement. 
Prior to the boycott is the campaign for the boycott. The campaign exists ‘here’ in the unions, 
‘here’ in the churches, ‘here’ in the political parties. The boycott campaign tends to operate by 
defining those who disagree with its strategy of boycott as supporters of Israel. It rejects the 
notion that there can be different ways of showing solidarity with Palestinians or different ways of 
supporting the peace movement. 
The boycott campaign’s treatment of the distinction between civil society and state in Israel as 
uniquely fictional facilitates the treatment of citizens as though they were responsible for state 
policy. The boycotters treat opponents of the boycott within the progressive movement as proxy 
Israelis and so by extension agents of the Israeli state. Opponents are called ‘lobbyists’ or ‘agents’ 
in order to signal their illegitimacy. In the narrative of the boycotters, lobbyists or agents of Israel 
should be no more recognised as authentic within the progressive movement than Israel itself is 
recognised as authentic in the Middle East. 
Many of these opponents of the boycott campaign who are thus defined as being foreign to the 
progressive movement are Jews. The boycott campaign sets up a presumption or a suspicion 
around Jews; that they are in some sense collaborators with Zionism, conceived of in hateful 
terms. True, the boycotters offer Jews routes by which they can show that this presumption is 
unfair in their own special case. It offers them opportunities to disavow Israel or Zionism or their 
institutional connections. But it is the presumption and the suspicion that is important in itself. In 
any case, for most Jews the route of disavowal is too redolent of historic antisemitisms to be a 
tolerable option. These are the logical progressions by which discursive and institutional 
antisemitism follow in the wake of the boycott campaign. But in the end the relationship between 
hostility to Israel and antisemitism is an empirical one, not a logical one. Experience shows that 
they are related. 
From 2003 the campaign to boycott Israel began to take shape within the forerunner unions of the 
UCU. By 2011, virtually nobody was left in the decision making structures who was willing and able 
to oppose the boycott campaign. UCU Congress that year resolved to campaign against the 
European Union Monitoring Commission (EUMC) Working Definition of Antisemitism because that 
definition provided a framework by which certain kinds of hostility to Israel, taking context into 
account, could be understood as antisemitic. The union, instead of ceasing to do things which were 
potentially antisemitic according to the working definition, resolved instead to fight against the 
working definition. (For more on struggles over definitions of antisemitism, seeHirsh 2012 and 
Marcus 2015). 
The proponents of the boycott campaign do not think of themselves as Jew-haters but they do set 
themselves up in a fight with the overwhelming majority of the world’s Jews. (For further analysis 
of antisemitism of which the carriers are not conscious, see Hirsh 2013.) The boycotters seek to 
punish Israel for human rights abuses and to hold all Israelis collectively responsible for the 
actions of their government; they target no other state for boycott and they seek collective 
punishment for no other citizens. Those who oppose the boycott campaign are treated as though 
they are enemies of Palestine; they are identified as outsiders. Jews are more likely to have 
personal, family or work connections to Israel; they are more likely to feel compelled to speak up 
against a campaign that seeks to put Israelis outside of the community of the progressive, the 
rational, and the civilised. 
Moreover, there is a wider context: a deep reservoir of antisemitic discourse, images, emotions 
and tropes within what we might call ‘western’ culture. It has been deposited by the distinct waves 
of antisemitism that have washed over Europe since the original rise of Christianity out of Judaism. 
It would be surprising indeed if a campaign to make people think of Israelis as being outside of the 
community of the civilised did not draw, even unconsciously, on these ready-made ways of 
thinking, linked to intense affective triggers. The campaign to treat Israelis and their ‘supporters’ 
as pariahs tends to bring with it echoes of previous campaigns against Jews. Images and tropes 
from old antisemitic themes are unconsciously recycled, and Jews who oppose the boycott are 
framed as conspiratorial, powerful, rich, bloodthirsty (particularly for children’s blood), bourgeois, 
connected to dishonest bankers, warmongers etc. 
After the last opponents of the boycott had resigned or been pushed out of the UCU, there was a 
final attempt to marshal the evidence of antisemitism within the union and to get a fair hearing for 
it. Ronnie Fraser, a union member, initiated a court action against the UCU alleging that it had, in 
the language of the Equality Act 2010, ‘harassed’ him by ‘engaging in unwanted conduct’ relating 
to his Jewish identity, the ‘purpose and/or effect’ of which has been, and continues to be, to 
‘violate his dignity’ and/or create ‘an intimidating, hostile, degrading humiliating’ and/or ‘offensive 
environment’ for him. Fraser’s lawyer, Anthony Julius, described a complex but interlinked course 
of action by the union, including absence of action, which he said amounted to institutional 
antisemitism. 
The case was heard by the Employment Tribunal, in the autumn of 2012. It heard evidence on 
behalf of Fraser from 34 witnesses: union activists, scientists, sociologists, historians, lawyers, 
philosophers, Members of Parliament, Jews, Christians, Muslims, Atheists, academic experts on 
antisemitism, Jewish communal leaders. Witnesses gave written statements and were subjected to 
cross-examination. (Full disclosure: I was one of those witnesses). 
The key mode of intimidation that Fraser and the other witnesses described was a constant and 
relentless stream of allegations of bad faith. People who said that they had experienced or 
understood something said or done in the union as antisemitic were told that they were really only 
trying to de-legitimise criticism of Israeli human rights abuses and the boycott campaign. Rather 
than have the substance of what they were saying taken seriously, those who said they had 
experienced antisemitism were cast out of the union’s community of good faith and were 
constructed as enemies who were engaged in a campaign of trying to harm the union. 
However, what the Jews had suffered in the union, it turned out, they were now to suffer at the 
hands of the tribunal, which found against Fraser on everything: on technicalities, on legal 
argument, and on every significant issue of substance and of fact. The tribunal found everything 
the UCU said in its defence to be persuasive and it found nothing offered by Fraser or any of his 
witnesses to have merit. The culture, the practices and the norms inside the union were found to 
be not antisemitic, neither in intent nor in effect. Indeed, everything that Fraser and his witnesses 
experienced as antisemitic, the tribunal judged to have been entirely appropriate. The judgment 
had the form of reasoned judicial argument but it contained none of the grey, none of the 
complexity, none of the uncertainty which one would expect. 
The tribunal found, simply, that ‘at heart’ the case represented ‘an impermissible attempt to 
achieve a political end by litigious means…’ (para 178). In other words, the tribunal produced what 
amounted to a judicialLivingstone Formulation. 
The tribunal made clear that it believed that Fraser was trying to mobilise a bad-faith allegation of 
antisemitism in order to silence good-faith critics of Israel when it continued, ‘We are also troubled 
by the implications of the claim. Underlying it we sense a worrying disregard for pluralism, 
tolerance and freedom of expression.’ 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the tribunal in fact refused to delve into the detail of the 
evidence, ‘a trial bundle of 23 volumes’. If it had done so it would have perhaps been concerned 
by some of it and perhaps remained unconvinced by other elements. What the tribunal seems to 
have done instead is to accept the union’s overall narrative of the case. The union presented itself 
as a neutral and progressive institution, many of whose members were keen to show solidarity 
with the Palestinians. It presented those who supported Fraser as slick and dishonest but 
formidable and articulate nevertheless. It said that they were trying to pull the wool over the eyes 
of other union members and then the tribunal itself, in an attempt to mobilise the victim-power of 
the allegation of antisemitism. 
In a few places in the judgement, the tribunal could be thought to have allowed its contempt to 
show through. It contrasted the ‘down-to-earth style’ of Ronnie Fraser to the ‘the magnificent 
prose in which his written case was couched’ by Anthony Julius. One might think it is 
unremarkable for a lawyer to be more eloquent than his client. But here there seems to be an 
allusion to Fraser’s prestigious and expensive representation. The Tribunal goes on: ‘what makes 
this litigation doubly regrettable is its gargantuan scale.’ This may be read as alluding to the power 
of those who are assumed to be financing the case. From Fraser’s point of view, however, it may 
equally be thought that the union was the powerful rich institution. In fact, the Fraser case was 
less than half-heartedly supported by the voluntary institutions of the Jewish community and it 
relied to a great extent on the commitment of one individual, the lawyer Anthony Julius. 
Three of Fraser’s witnesses were praised by the tribunal as being ‘careful, thoughtful, courteous’ in 
form and ‘mindful of their obligations as witnesses’. The content of their evidence was, 
nevertheless, totally disregarded. 
His other witnesses were accused of ‘playing to the gallery’, ‘ventilating their opinions’ and 
enjoying making speeches in the witness box. The union’s witnesses, good honest simple union 
officials, were, said the tribunal, ‘rather less colourful’ than the claimant’s, and were there ‘for the 
mundane purpose of telling’. The simplistic distinction made between fact and opinion sits 
uncomfortably with the difficult realities of communicating experiences of antisemitism, and the 
understandings which those experiences helped to shape. 
The tribunal chose not to hide its irritation. It did not regard the allegation of institutional 
antisemitism as being worthy of its time as compared to the deserving cases that the tribunal 
ought to be dealing with, allegations of discriminatory treatment which it considered genuine: 
The Employment Tribunals are a hard-pressed public service and it is not right that their limited 
resources should be squandered as they have been in this case. Nor, if (contrary to our view) it 
was proper to face them with any claim at all, should the Respondents have been put to the 
trouble and expense of defending proceedings of this order or anything like it. 
Later, when the union pursued Ronnie Fraser for its costs, amounting to hundreds of thousands of 
pounds, the tribunal was forced to admit that it had over-reached its own powers in its enthusiasm 
to emphasise the inappropriateness of the case having been brought. It was forced to recuse itself 
from adjudicating the costs application on the basis that it had already pre-judged the issue in its 
original judgment. However, new judges were appointed and they closed ranks with the original 
tribunal, going out of their way to praise its substantive judgment. 
There was an instructive exchange during the cross examination of the General Secretary of the 
UCU, Sally Hunt. Anthony Julius took her through a large number of examples of allegedly 
antisemitic things which had been said or written within union spaces; during Congress, at other 
meetings and on the UCU activists’ email list. Hunt considered each example and she judged each 
one in turn to be not antisemitic. As though rather exasperated, Julius put a hypothetical to her: 
‘If somebody said, “If you want to understand the Jews, read Mein Kampf”, would that be 
antisemitic?’ Hunt answered that within the union context, because the union is an antiracist 
union, then no, it would not necessarily be antisemitic. 
This answer is an explicit endorsement of the politics of position over the politics of reason. For 
Hunt, what was important in judging whether a statement was antisemitic was the space in which 
it was made and the people who made it, not the content of the statement itself. Like Badiou, who 
claimed that left-wing antisemitism was logically impossible because antisemitism is by definition 
not left wing, Hunt regards antisemitism within an antiracist union to be unthinkable. Instead of 
coming to terms with the normalisation of antisemitism in the union, Hunt defined the antisemitic 
behaviour and the antisemitic speech as being antiracist, not by virtue of its content but by virtue 
of its occurrence within a space which is a priori not antisemitic. Anybody who challenges this a 
priori truth must be cast out; anybody who tries to engage with the truth by discussion, reason, 
evidence or argument risks their status as part of the community. 
Having presided over the relentless cross examination of Sally Hunt, having seen her deny that 
each example was antisemitic, having seen her reject even the hypothetical, Judge Snelson 
scolded Anthony Julius in a rather condescending way and expressed the hope that Julius would 
soon come to discussing the evidence of the case. 
Case Study 3: How the Corbyn faction puts its political opponents outside the room rather than 
reply to their criticisms 
The final case study is an examination of a number of examples of how the dictum ‘Jeremy doesn’t 
do personal’ has been inverted into personalised attacks against Corbyn’s critics. The effect of this 
inversion has been to avoid addressing the criticism by throwing the critic out of the community of 
the good. Once the critic is excommunicated, their criticism is cauterised and a warning is served 
on other potential critics. 
On 14 August 2015, as Jeremy Corbyn emerged as a front runner in the leadership election, the 
Jewish Chronicle (JC) took the unprecedented step of giving over its front page to seven questions 
regarding Corbyn’s record on the issue of antisemitism (JC Editorial 2015). 
It asked him about his relationship with campaign called ‘Deir Yassin Remembered’ which was run 
by Paul Eissen, a man who came out as an open Holocaust denier. Eissen said that Corbyn had 
donated money and had been supportive. 
The JC asked Corbyn about his planned appearance the following week on a platform with Carlos 
Latuff, an antizionist and antisemitic cartoonist who had been awarded the second prize in 
President Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust Denial cartoon contest in Tehran. 
The JC asked Corbyn about his defence of Steven Sizer and his own accusation that Sizer’s critics 
had been Zionists who were trying to smear him unfairly. 
The paper asked Corbyn about his relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah, antisemitic 
organisations which he had referred to as ‘friends’ and which he had warmly supported, saying 
they were dedicated to peace and justice in the Middle East (Video 2). 
Corbyn was asked why he had never condemned the antisemitic posters and banners that 
dominate the annual Al-Quds Day rally, sponsored by Stop the War, of which Corbyn was the 
National Chair. 
Corbyn was asked why he defended Raed Salah as an ‘honoured citizen’, a man who had explicitly 
employed medieval style blood libel rhetoric in order to incite people against Jews. 
Corbyn’s answers were not convincing (JC Reporter 2015). He said he could not remember giving 
money to Eissen. He said that he had supported Eissen’s campaign before it became clear that he 
was an antisemite, but so did a lot of other people. He said that he had decided not to appear with 
Latuff but he did not say why. He said that he had defended Sizer as being the victim of a Zionist 
smear campaign before Sizer had become an antisemite, not after. 
Corbyn’s stock answer as to why he referred to Hamas and Hezbollah as ‘friends’ is that it was 
diplomatic language and that he was engaged in the peace process. He used the same ‘diplomatic 
language’ excuse in relation to his defence of Raed Salah, the blood libeller. In truth, Corbyn has 
embraced the politics of Hamas and Hezbollah, he has been hosted by Hamas in Gaza, he does not 
criticise their antisemitism, he is not worried by their links to the Iranian regime; in short, he 
thinks that they are freedom fighters. 
Corbyn answered the question about antisemitic banners and posters by saying that he opposes 
antisemitism. 
His answers to the Jewish Chronicle were evasive and partial. But the answer which has real kick, 
the one which the Corbyn faction really relies on, is that Corbyn supports the Palestinians, and the 
people who accuse him of antisemitism are doing so to smear him in order to silence his criticism 
of Israel. 
James Bloodworth, the editor of the Left Foot Forward blog, appeared on the BBC Radio 4 Today 
Programme on 28 August 2015. He went out of his way to begin with the customary throat-
clearing disclaimer that nobody is saying that Corbyn is antisemitic. Bloodworth then explained 
why there was a problem with Corbyn’s tolerance for antisemitism and his participation in, and 
support for, antisemitic organisations and movements. 
In response, Diane Abbott, a senior left wing Labour MP went on the attack. This attempt to 
portray Corbyn as antisemitic was a sign, she said, that the ‘Westminster Elite’ and the ‘Political 
Class’ were afraid of him and his anti-austerity agenda. Abbott marshalled all of her rhetorical 
power to make clear that such questions were impertinent and inappropriate; that they were 
‘personal’ attacks and not political. She answered them by portraying Bloodworth as having 
overstepped the boundary of political honesty and decency; British politeness too. 
The previous week, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown had written a piece in The Independent headed ‘Fling 
mud if you must but don’t call Jeremy Corbyn an Anti-semite’. 
It is an accusation that is both absurd and menacing. The right, Blairites and hard Zionists 
have formed the most unholy of alliances to slay the reputation of the next likely leader of 
the Labour party. … Most depressing of all is the collusion between the powerful right and 
Zionists. They seem determined to crush all alternatives to neoliberal economics and 
Western hegemony. … As the forces of darkness turn on Corbyn, the leadership contest 
continues its descent into a passion play. (Alibhai-Brown 2015) 
Alibhai-Brown mobilizes all of the fierce, outraged denunciation that she can muster against those 
who dare to raise the issue of antisemitism. Ironically she makes use of a number of antisemitic 
tropes in doing so. She employs righteous anger at the impertinence of it. There is also an appeal 
to the Jewish authority of antizionist Jews, those Jews whose place within the community of the 
progressive is assured. ‘The right, Blairites and hard Zionists’ are the ones employing this dirtiest 
imaginable political manoeuvre, she says. The ‘forces of darkness’ are the ‘powerful right’ and 
‘Zionists’. Alibhai-Brown’s piece is not even particularly supportive of Corbyn as a candidate for 
Labour leader, but what it does do is police the boundaries of the community of the progressive. 
Blairites and the right are outside, along with ‘hard Zionists’ and ‘Zionists’. 
In July, Corbyn had been interviewed on Channel 4 News (Video 3). Krishnan Guru-Murthy asks 
him why he referred to Hamas and Hezbollah as his ‘friends’. Corbyn repeats his stock answer that 
he is in favour of a peace process and that should include Hamas. Gury-Murthy asks again why he 
called them ‘friends’. Corbyn begins to get angry and accuses him of interrupting his answer. He 
carried on his speech about peace negotiations and Gury-Murthy asks for a third time why he 
called them ‘friends’. Corbyn starts to raise his voice and to point, demanding to be allowed to 
finish. He accuses Guru-Murthy of being unprepared to discuss the wider issues of the Middle East. 
The issue is this, he says: ‘Hamas and Hezbollah are part of a peace process…’ When pushed again 
on whether Corbyn considers Hamas and Hezbollah to be friends, he accuses Gury-Murthy of 
‘trying to trivialise the whole discussion…’. Eventually Corbyn sits back in his chair and declares: 
‘thanks for the tabloid journalism’. When cornered, Corbyn preferred to try to cast Guru Murthy 
out of the community of the good (‘tabloid!’) rather than to respond to the question seriously. 
  
PART 3: WHAT WE LOST WHEN WE LOST THE ASPIRATION TO BE 
AUTONOMOUS RATIONAL SUBJECTS 
The great philosophers of modernity articulated the revolt against the divine right of kings and 
against the clerics who, with the authority of God, told us what to think. Descartes democratised 
knowledge, insisting that what was important was method, reason and evidence, not the power of 
the knower. Rousseau, Hobbes and Kant put the rational individual, thinking about the world and 
deciding what to do, at the heart of the new democratic politics. The American Declaration of 
Independence raised the pursuit of happiness to an inherent and inalienable right. 
Then along came the social theorists who said that ideal of the human being as an engaged, 
rational, autonomous subject was not exactly realised in the real world. It was a world where lots 
of power structures got in the way of allowing individual human beings to know and to pursue their 
own rational interests. We make history, but not under the circumstances of our own choosing. We 
construct our world but we are also constructed by it: we are given language, thoughts, habits, 
education, nation, religion, gender and race. They become part of us, part of how we relate to the 
world and part of how the world relates to us. 
So the absolute centrality of the principle of the rational autonomous subject was eroded. Hegel 
founded human agency in the material world; Marx said our decisions were manifestations of 
social relations; sociologists said that the social world constructs us as much as we construct it; 
feminists said that women were excluded from the rational; Freud said that the subconscious is 
more telling than the conscious; Arendt said that rational critique could feed into a swirl of 
totalitarian rage; Said argued that colonialism clouds our thinking with racism; Foucault said that 
rational knowledge is still corrupted by power. 
These social theorists were right to see the ways in which real human beings fell short of the ideal 
of the politically, ethically and legally rational and responsible subject. But many of their followers 
were not satisfied with that intuition. They went on to create accounts of the mass of humanity as 
being wholly determined by social forces. The idea of the human being as a subject with agency 
was ridiculed as a bourgeois and oppressive fiction. It was replaced with the division of the world 
into the oppressor as a rational subject, white, male, rich; and the oppressed as the irrational 
object, black, female, poor. 
There was always, perhaps, a seed of this kind of worldview present in the social critique of 
bourgeois liberalism, but it has grown to dominate oppositional thinking. 
In March 2008, John Molyneux, a leading intellectual of the Socialist Workers Party, at the time the 
most influential organisation of the Marxist left in the UK, wrote: 
… an illiterate, conservative, superstitious Muslim Palestinian peasant who supports Hamas 
is more progressive than an educated liberal atheist Israeli who supports Zionism (even 
critically). (Molyneux 2008) 
Molyneux is clear. Who you are in the global binary of oppressor/oppressed is everything; what 
you think, what you say, what you do, is nothing at all. 
The Enlightenment ideal was that to relate seriously to somebody was to relate seriously to the 
content of what they say. The ‘new politics’ is less interested in what you say and more interested 
in whether you are part of the global community of the oppressed or the global network of the 
oppressors. The more rational you seem, the more you’re likely to be shoved into the oppressor 
camp. This shove is achieved by power and not by debate; not yet, in the Corbyn Labour Party, by 
physical violence, but by the kind of discursive violence that silences opponents and puts them out 
of the room. 
It was the Marxists who embraced the notion of ‘false consciousness’. They could see that workers 
were oppressed and that what they needed to do was to unite with all the other workers, the 
overwhelming majority of humanity, and to make a revolution. The problem was that the workers 
did not yet understand their own position and their own role in history. The Marxists believed that 
the working class would inevitably become conscious of its own role; a class not only ‘in itself’ but 
also ‘for itself’. 
Max Weber (1978) responded that: 
The most classical expression of this pseudo-scientific use of concepts is the contention of a gifted 
writer that the individual may well mistake his own interests, but the ‘class’ is ‘infallible’ about its 
interests. 
The contemporary version of ‘false consciousness’ is still more presumptuous than the Marxist one. 
Now, the metropolitan intellectuals award themselves the role of speaking for the oppressed. They 
have given up hope that the oppressed will become conscious and embrace the truth as elucidated 
by the metropolitan intellectuals. They think that because the oppressed are so excluded from the 
power discourses of rationality, they are only able to feel; thinking is too much to ask for from the 
oppressed. Excluded from reason, they are left with only passion. The job of the intellectuals is to 
interpret the passion of the oppressed into the language of reason. For example, some Palestinians 
may embrace Jew-hatred; they may participate in suicide bombing; they may perpetrate random 
knife attacks on Jews. Their role, according to their western supporters, is not to be rational, to 
become conscious, and to develop universal socialist political forms; their role is to act through 
passion. The intellectuals co-opt the orientalist image of the passionate native and they interpret 
this passion into whatever language and ideas is convenient to them. 
Democracy itself, along with freedom of expression, law, truth and human rights, now become 
suspect; they hide the reality of raw power behind a facade of legitimating discourse. Costas 
Douzinas tells that Spanish soldiers unfurled banners in response to the Napoleonic invasion that 
read ‘Down With Freedom!’ He suggests, and hopes, that the oppressed may soon be ready to 
raise the slogan ‘Down With Human Rights!’ (Douzinas 2000). The idea that human rights are 
western and imperialist is standard in contemporary progressive discourse and is routinely taught 
in universities. It leaves people who campaign for human rights within what is thought of as the 
‘community of the oppressed’, entirely unsupported; not only unsupported but even constructed as 
opponents of the global coalition against imperialism. Campaigners for human rights, for women’s 
rights, for lesbian and gay rights, against what are thought of as ‘anti-imperialist regimes’ are, 
themselves, in danger of being slung out of both the communities of the oppressed and of the 
progressive. 
Any apparent concession won under existing conditions is considered insignificant. ‘Manufactured 
consent’ (Herman and Chomsky 1995), say the radical intellectuals, is not consent at all, but false 
consciousness. It is this ultra-radical and one-sided critique of everything valued in bourgeois 
society that both Hannah Arendt (1975), and George Orwell (2004), in their distinct ways, identify 
as characteristically totalitarian. It is above all the ‘pursuit of happiness’ and personal relationships 
that are prohibited under totalitarianism. Everything human must be subordinated to the ultimate 
collective goal. 
CONCLUSION: HOW ‘CAMPISM’ PERSONIFIED BECAME THE LABOUR 
PARTY’S DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS 
Jeremy Corbyn has appointed Seumas Milne as his Chief of Communications. Milne’s own political 
tradition is the Stalinist wing of the British Communist Party. Later he was close to George 
Galloway and the Respect party. From 2001 Milne was the comment editor atThe Guardian and 
since 2007 he has been an associate editor of the whole paper. All the while he has been writing 
model opinion pieces and editorials demonstrating how to describe events in the world plausibly 
within the ‘campist’ and anti-imperialist paradigm. 
Two days after 9/11 he wrote a piece headed: ‘They can’t see why they are hated’(Milne 2001), 
which assigned responsibility for the attack to US foreign policy. As though oblivious of the fall of 
the Soviet Union, Milne is still a cheerleader for Russian opposition to NATO, is still an apologist for 
its authoritarian leader and is still unconcerned about Ukraine’s assertion of its right to self-
determination (Milne 2015). There is video of Corbyn himself, two days after the tube and bus 
bombings in London on 7/7, with George Galloway at his shoulder, saying to an applauding crowd: 
‘We have to recognise that the security of this country is at risk. It’s at risk because of the way we 
inflict an insecurity on so many other people around the world.’ (Video 4). 
Milne also embraces the notion that where people are situated in the spectrum of global 
oppression is more politically significant than what they do and what they say. In defence of a pro-
Hamas column (2008) he wrote: 
Hamas and the support it attracts is only the current expression of a spirit of Palestinian 
national resistance to oppression and dispossession going back decades. (Hirsh 2008, in 
comments) 
Indeed, it may be unsurprising if some Palestinians respond to the everyday realities of the Israeli 
occupation in the language of antisemitism. Milne himself sees it as his own job to translate 
antisemitic language back into the democratic language of a timeless ‘spirit of Palestinian national 
resistance.’ By doing so, he replaces what actually happens with what he wishes was 
happening. He tells us what Palestinians, conceived as being without significant internal 
diversity,really mean if they vote for Hamas. And what they really mean, according to Milne’s 
translation, is that they want an inclusive, non-racist, and democratic state. 
When Milne (Hirsh 2008, in comments) was challenged about Hamas and its antisemitic charter in 
2008, he said that it was obsolete and that bringing it up in discussion was a sign of bad faith. In 
response to a claim that he was ‘apologizing for, and denying, racism against Jews’ in his support 
for Hamas, he responded with a venom which can only be explained by the desire to make clear 
that such criticism is beyond all that is appropriate within polite antiracist discourse. Milne 
characterised the claim as ‘perverse and contemptible’ on the basis that the Hamas charter of 
1988 was admittedly a ‘reactionary, anti-Jewish document’, but it had been repeatedly disavowed 
by Hamas leaders, specifically in relation to the anti-Jewish tropes. It is noticeable that even about 
the charter, Milne could not bring himself to use the word ‘antisemitic’. Of course, the disavowal 
was only a rumour put around for the use of liberal apologists in democratic countries. Seven 
years on, we are still waiting for such a disavowal from the Hamas leadership. 
The politics of position not the politics of reason is coming to predominate in the UK Labour 
movement and in the universities. It has some chance, albeit not a big chance, of forming the next 
government. It has clear totalitarian potential because it is more concerned with the ‘objective’ 
position of a person or a group, in a fixed and essentialist schema, than with what that person or 
group says or does. The 20th-century totalitarians defined the core enemies of the good as 
capitalists, kulaks, Jews, or gays. What capitalists, kulaks, Jews or gays said and what they did 
was irrelevant. They were treated as though they blocked the road of the community of the good, 
on its journey to the good society. 
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